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ABSTRACT
In this paper we examine the role of syndicated loan markets in ﬁnancial market
development in 24 European countries. We ﬁnd credit spreads to be negatively related
to market size in small markets and positively related in large ﬁnancial markets. Syn-
dicated loans play a different role in large versus small ﬁnancial systems. In small
markets, loan syndications are a substitute for missing public debt markets, while in
large ﬁnancial markets loan syndicates enable arrangers to spread risk more efﬁciently.
Foreign banks tend to reinforce this effect. In small markets, they transfer external
ﬁnance across borders and in large markets they tend to take on more risky projects.
Consequently, we ﬁnd that characteristics of loan contracts arranged by foreign banks
in small versus large markets differ considerably.
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One of the puzzles of 20th century macroeconomics is the extent to which capital market
integration did not occur. Feldstein and Horioka (1980) famously observed that even among
developed countries capital markets were barely integrated. However, signs of change in
the aggregate data do appear in the mid 1990s (Blanchard and Giavazzi 2002). In addition,
banking data also indicates that capital market integration is ﬁnally underway. The volume
of cross border lending has risen dramatically, cross border bank mergers are common and
barriers to foreign bank entry have broken down (Clarke, Cull, Peria, and Sanchez 2003).
The evidence with national data does not indicate exactly how market integration is taking
place. In this paper we use disaggregated data on the syndicated loan market in Europe to
investigate the patterns of capital market integration. More speciﬁcally, we examine two
issues: ﬁrst, the role that the syndicated loan markets plays in capital market integration,
especially in countries with small ﬁnancial systems and second, the role foreign banks play
in the process.
The syndicated loan market provides a good laboratory to examine how integration
takes place because it is large and has many cross border features. In this market ﬁrms can
go to either domestic or foreign banks (or a consortium of both) that will syndicate a loan
to buyers in any market. We will use detailed data on syndicated loans, including interest
rates, from Dealscan. We match the loan data with information about the borrowing ﬁrms
from Amadeus. Thus, our data set includes detailed information on lenders and borrowers
throughout Europe for the period 1995 - 2007.1
Although syndicated loans are often viewed as a hybrid with characteristics of bank
loans and public debt, they are closer to bank debt because of the role of the lead arranger
(Dennis and Mullineaux 2000 and Suﬁ 2007). The lead arranger drafts the loan terms, mon-
itors compliance and typically holds the largest share of the loan. Of course, the fact that
the loan is syndicated and that only a part of it is likely to remain on the balance sheet of the
1The one drawback of the data set is that it is restricted to relatively large ﬁrms and loans. Small businesses,
entrepreneursandnon-corporateborrowerswillnotbeparticipatinginthismarketsoourtopiciscapitalmarket
globalization for larger ﬁrms.
1arranger creates pricing incentives that might be different than in other debt markets (Har-
joto, Mullineaux, and Yi 2006). However, our interest is not the comparison of syndicated
loans to other sources of ﬁnancing but in the activities of foreign arrangers in the syndicated
loan market and differences in market activity across countries. Although loan syndication
is an international phenomenon with broadly similar characteristics in many countries, there
is little prior cross-national research. Carey and Nini (2007) examine the home bias in syn-
dicated lending and are puzzled by unexplained pricing discrepancies between the U.S. and
European markets.
There does not appear to be any prior research that looks at the implications of this loan
market for capital market development and integration in Europe. In addition, this paper is
the ﬁrst to analyze the speciﬁc role of foreign banks in syndicated loan markets. Many
syndicated loans involve cross border activity. In our sample 71 percent of all syndicated
loans include at least some foreign participation and in 29 percent of the syndicated loans a
foreign bank is the lead arranger. There is an extensive literature on foreign banking activity
but it virtually always discusses the expansion of banks into smaller or emerging markets. In
the syndicated loan market we ﬁnd foreign bank expansion in both large and small countries.
Thus, our extensive data on syndicated loans allows us to investigate some important
questions about the development of capital markets. First, how does the syndicated loan
market work to integrate capital markets? Second, what motivates foreign banks to arrange
cross border loans and enter new markets? Third, why do ﬁnancial institutions operate
differently in small and large countries?
Small countries, and there are many countries in Europe with tiny ﬁnancial markets,
suffer a disadvantage (Bossone and Long 2001, Andritzky 2007). In addition to disec-
onomies of scale, small economy markets are unable to provide the range of services found
in major ﬁnancial centers from sophisticated equity markets to competitive provision of
banking services. Such disadvantages of size should be an incentive for ﬁrms to seek ﬁ-
nancing from foreign sources. We will show that syndicated loans with foreign lead banks
compensate for the disadvantages of small size in smaller European countries.
2In addition, syndicated lending has increased in large countries as well. In large coun-
tries the syndicated loans have high interest rates suggesting that loan syndications allow for
ﬁnancing of riskier projects by increasing the supply of funds and increasing risk sharing
possibilities. Thus, in large countries as well, syndication is a form of capital market glob-
alization. In summary, the availability of loan syndication appears to be a supply shift in
small countries and a demand shift in large countries. That is, it increases the availability of
credit in small markets and leads to lower rates. While in large countries, it leads to greater
demand by ﬁrms that were otherwise constrained and increases rates.
In the ﬁrst section, we describe the dataset constructed from Dealscan and Amadeus
and brieﬂy summarize earlier work on syndicated loans. In the second section, we develop
our hypotheses and relate them to the literature. In section three, we present estimates of
our base line model for rate spreads in the syndication market and describe how the market
is affected by the size and depth of national capital markets. In the following section, we
use a probit model to explain the choice between foreign and domestic lead bankers. The
last section summarizes our conclusions.
2. Data and literature
Our primary sample is based on syndicated loans from Loan Pricing Corporation’s Dealscan
dataset for all European countries that report more than 50 loans. We specialize on only one
speciﬁc geographic area in order to reduce the problem of cross-country heterogeneity.2
Dealscan provides detailed information on loan contract terms (most importantly the spread
above LIBOR), lead arrangers and lenders. Excluding loans to the ﬁnance industry, we
obtain information on 15,585 deals for the years 1995 to 2007. Deﬁnitions of the variables
constructed from Dealscan are shown in Table I. These include loan characteristics such as
maturity and size. In addition, other work (Suﬁ 2007) with the Dealscan data has indicated
that both the loan purpose and the tranche type have a signiﬁcant effect on loan rates. The
2Carey and Nini (2007) ﬁnd that there a signiﬁcant differences in loan pricing between different geographic
areas that cannot be explained by loan, borrower and lender characteristics.
3parameterization here with dummy variables is designed to capture these inﬂuences in a
tractable fashion.
In order to obtain more information on the characteristics of the borrowing ﬁrm, we
match the Dealscan data on loan contracts to Bureau van Dyck’s Amadeus database for ﬁ-
nancial statements. The characteristics of the borrowing ﬁrm capture differences in risk due
to the ﬁrm’s industry and the ﬁnancial condition of the ﬁrm. Amadeus is a comprehensive,
pan-European database containing ﬁnancial information on public and private companies
of all sizes. Since there is no common identiﬁcation code for the Amadeus and Dealscan
databases, we match the two datasets by ﬁrm name and industry classiﬁcation code using
the ’Reclink’ algorithm in Stata. We are able to obtain ﬁrm data from Amadeus for 6416
Dealscan loan contracts. Since we do not know whether a loan was granted at the end,
beginning or within a year, we match the accounting data from the year t-1 to each loan
contract that was that became active in year t. If accounting data for the year t-1 was not
available for a given ﬁrm, we use data from year t. The distribution of observations across
countries is shown Table II along with the mean spreads. Finally we obtain macro data on
ﬁnancial sector size, development and concentration from the World Bank World Develop-
ment Indicators and from Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2008). The mean spread over LIBOR
of syndicated loans differs enormously across European countries. Foreign banks charge on
average a higher spread than domestic banks, which can be explained by higher costs for for-
eign banks to overcome cultural and regulatory barriers involved with cross-border lending
(Buch 2003, Mian 2006).3 Loan contracts with several lead arrangers that have at least one
foreign and one domestic participant in the lead role show the lowest average spread. This
could be due to competitive supply and the presence of a domestic arranger. The differences
in mean spreads across countries can of course be due to a variety of factors including the
characteristics of the borrowers and of the loans. We will control for these characteristics
and examine the determinants of loan spreads further in the following section.
We are not the ﬁrst researchers to utilize the Dealscan data on loan syndications. Ear-
lier work has focused on the structure of the ﬁnancial industry without information about the
3A bank is deﬁned as foreign owned if foreigners or foreign entities own 50 percent or more of its assets. In
addition, a bank is considered foreign if it is a subsidiary of a domestic bank that is itself owned by foreigners.
4borrowing ﬁrmorcharacteristicsofthenational markets. Forexample, Harjoto, Mullineaux,
and Yi (2006) examine the differences in loan pricing by investment banks and commercial
banks and, similarly, Steffen (2008) analyzes the effect on loan pricing of an ongoing bank-
ing relationship between the lead arranger and the borrower. Earlier, Carey, Post, and Sharpe
(1998) used syndicated loan data to examine differences in the lending behavior of banks
and private ﬁnance companies. They ﬁnd that both types of intermediaries are equally likely
to ﬁnance information-problematic borrowers. Ivashina (2008) models the determinants of
the fraction of a syndicated loan that is retained by the lead bank. Suﬁ (2007) examines the
determinants of syndicated loan structures and ﬁnds that when the moral hazard problem in
loan monitoring is severe, a larger share of the loan is retained by the lead bank. Qian and
Strahan (2007) ﬁnd that institutional quality (e.g. creditor rights) inﬂuences the characteris-
tics of syndicated loan contracts. In countries with stronger creditor protection, loans have
more concentrated ownership, longer maturities, and lower interest rates.
Among the recent papers on syndicated lending, our analysis is most closely related to
Carey and Nini (2007). They examine differences in syndicated loan pricing in geographic
areas. They ﬁnd that interest rate spreads on loans are smaller in Europe than in the US
which cannot be explained by differences in lender, borrower or loan characteristics. They
argue that the differences persist because borrowers have a strong home bias. Thus, national
markets remain segmented which differs from our ﬁndings below that cross border syndica-
tion and foreign bank participation have led to substantial strides in market integration.
3. Hypotheses
The ﬁrst issue we examine is the relationship between the size of a ﬁnancial system and the
average spread on syndicated loans. Small and large ﬁnancial markets tend to differ in sev-
eral dimensions. First, larger more developed ﬁnancial systems are more competitive. They
tend to have less concentrated banking systems and more active non-bank ﬁnancial institu-
tions competing as lenders (Bossone and Long 2001). There is additional competition from
cross border lending and relatively high volumes of syndicated loans in larger countries.
5Furthermore, equity and bond markets are concentrated around large ﬁnancial centers and
play a negligible role in small ﬁnancial systems. Second, the prevalence of large banks leads
to scale economies in ﬁnancial services that should be reﬂected in smaller spreads. Third,
standardized accounting information, ratings agencies and active public securities markets
all serve to make information about ﬁrms more transparent in large markets.
Banking markets in small ﬁnancial systems are generally more concentrated and less
competitive (Bossone and Long 2001). The well-known structure-conduct paradigm for the
banking industry suggests a positive relationship between loan rates and market concentra-
tion (Hannan 1991). There exists, however, a competing theory developed by Petersen and
Rajan (1995). They argue that banks are better able to build up a relationship with their
clients in a less competitive banking sector. In this case, banks with market power can offer
lower interest rates because they are better informed. Thus, there are arguments that spreads
might be higher or lower in smaller countries with less competitive ﬁnancial industries.4
Furthermore, syndicated loan markets are a device to spread credit risk among differ-
ent market players across borders. Thus, the relationship between market size and interest
spreads may differs from other credit markets. Syndicated loan markets may play a very
different role in large country ﬁnancial systems where there is an ample supply of ﬁnance
from other sources as compared to small countries. When there is an ample supply of funds
from traditional sources such as banks and public debt markets, loan syndications enable ar-
rangers to spread risks efﬁciently and thus increase the supply of funds to risky ventures. As
a result, loan syndication in large ﬁnancial markets may be associated with higher risks and
larger spreads. In small ﬁnancial systems, however, loan syndications might be a substitute
for the missing public debts markets. Syndication increases the supply of lending services
and may be associated with lower spreads in smaller less developed ﬁnancial markets.
These arguments are summarized in our ﬁrst two hypotheses:
H1: Interest rate spreads on syndicated loans may decrease or increase with the size of
a ﬁnancial market.
4Evidence from other markets suggests that spreads are higher when banking is more concentrated and less
competitive (e.g. Cetorelli and Strahan 2006, Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Martinez Peria 2007.
6H2: Rate spreads are negatively related to market size and depth in small counties and
positively related in large countries.
The next issue of interest is the function foreign banks play in syndicated loan markets
in small and large ﬁnancial systems. In the traditional banking market, Claessens and van
Horen (2008) argue that banks enter a foreign market when they can increase proﬁtabil-
ity within an acceptable risk proﬁle. In developed countries, the literature presumes that
foreign banks follow their home customers (Buch and Golder 2001). Their activities are
often unproﬁtable in developed markets but are viewed as important to their home coun-
try strategy. For developing markets, foreign banks bring expertise and funding availability
to underdeveloped ﬁnancial markets. Studies of the relative performance of foreign banks
such as Claessens, Demirguc-Kunt, and Huizinga (2001) and Bonin, Hasan, and Wachtel
(2005) ﬁnd that foreign banks have higher proﬁts than domestic banks in developing coun-
tries, but the opposite is the case for developed countries. We will examine whether similar
motivations are reﬂected in the syndicated loan market.
There is a wide literature on foreign banking that documents the costs to foreign banks
in overcoming informational, cultural and regulatory barriers (Khanna and Palepu 1999,
Buch 2003). One ﬁnding of this literature is that foreign bank lending to informationally
opaque borrowers is restricted by the geographic and cultural distance between a foreign
bank’s headquarters and the local market (Mian 2006). Furthermore, foreign banks tend to
lend more to large ﬁrms thereby neglecting small and medium enterprises (Sengupta 2007).
Such informational costs may be higher in small foreign markets where the ﬁxed costs of
setting up a foreign operation cannot be spread across a large volume of activity. In this
case, foreign lead or arranger banks should have smaller spreads in large developed markets
than in small markets. That is, if better risk management and technology advantages are the
rationale for foreign bank activity then we should observe smaller spreads in larger markets
(orsmallerdifferencebetweenthespreadsforforeignanddomesticbanksinlargermarkets).
We maintain that foreign banking activity in syndicated loan markets differs from or-
dinary foreign bank entry. Foreign banks play different roles in small as compared to large
ﬁnancial systems. In small markets, loan syndication by foreign banks brings external ﬁ-
7nance to undeveloped markets. In large countries foreign bank activity is different. The
classic distinction that foreign banks lend to hard information ﬁrms and domestic banks to
soft information ﬁrms does not apply in large markets. Domestic banks in large markets
are able to provide external ﬁnancing for domestic as well as multinational ﬁrms. Thus, the
comparative advantage of foreign banks must lie elsewhere. Foreign banks in large markets
are better able to diversify risk than domestic banks because of their cross border activity.
Therefore they tend to take on more risky instead of less risky projects. Such lending should
be highly proﬁtable to foreign banks. These arguments are summarized by our next two
hypotheses:
H3: In large countries, foreign arrangers should be willing to take on more risk so
spreads should be larger as compared to small countries.
H4: Loan characteristics of foreign banks should differ in large versus small ﬁnancial
systems. Inlargeﬁnancialmarketsforeignleadarrangerbanksshouldlendtoriskierprojects
than in small markets.
4. Results
Syndicated loans are made with a variety of contractual structures and with various terms
and purposes. In addition, the loans are made to ﬁrms in all industries. Thus, before we
examine our hypotheses, we start with the formulation of a base line regression to explain
interest rate spreads in the syndicated loan market that controls for both loan and borrower
characteristics:
log(spreadijt) = ait +bjt +eijt (1)
The dependent variable is the logarithm of the spread between the Libor rate and the speciﬁc
loan contract rate. Loan contract characteristics are summarized by ait and borrower char-
acteristics by bjt. The variables used to control for the speciﬁc characteristics of the loan as
well as the risk characteristics of the borrowing ﬁrm are shown in Table I.
8Least squares estimates of the base line equation for all loans in our sample and with
loans for leveraged buyouts (LBOs) excluded are shown in the ﬁrst two columns of Table III.
The full sample regression consists of 4119 loans for which all data are available and with
LBO loans omitted the sample is reduced to 1840.5 The base line equation explains 56
percent of the variance in spreads in the full sample and 33 percent with LBOs excluded.
The dummy variable on LBO loans in the full sample equation indicates that the spread on
LBO loans is on average twice as large as the spread on other loans. Loans for ﬁnancing
LBOs are conceptually different than a ﬁrm’s borrowing for capital projects or operational
purposes. The very nature of an LBO indicates that there are other risk characteristics
that are not measured by the pre-loan ﬁnancial condition of the borrowing ﬁrm. For this
reason, we concentrate on estimates for the smaller sample that excludes LBO loans. The
last columns of Table III show the baseline equation estimated for loans with foreign lead
arrangers, domestic lead arrangers and mixed leads.
Although, thebaselineregressionexplainsalargeamountofthevarianceamongloans,
thelenderand loancharacteristicsdo not accountfor the largecountry effectsseeninthe raw
data. Of the control variables included in our speciﬁcation, the most important determinants
of the spread are the size of the loan and the size of the borrower, the borrowers leverage
ratio, the presence of covenants, whether the borrower is a public company and the loan
tranche type.6 In the following sections we use the basic framework provided by the base
line equation to explore the hypotheses posed above.
4.1. Market Size and loan spreads
Our ﬁrst hypothesis is about the relationship between market size and the average spread.
The summary statistics in Table II show clearly that spreads are higher in large countries.
Average rate spreads tend to be largest in the most developed markets such as Germany.
This observation could of course be due to differences in the characteristics of both lenders
5There are fewer observations in column (1) of Table III than in Table II because of missing data for some
loan and borrower characteristics.
6We do not show alternative speciﬁcations because the variables included are those suggested in the litera-
ture and the estimates are robust to including or excluding variables.
9and borrowers among countries. Syndicated loans are made with a variety of contractual
structures and with various terms and for various purposes. In addition, the loans are made
to ﬁrms in all industries. The characteristics of both borrowers and loan structures differ
from country to country
We use two measures of market size - the log of credit and the credit to GDP ratio -
which we add individually to the baseline equation. In the ﬁrst equation we examine the
actual size of the credit market, lgcredit is the log of total credit (in billions of $ for the
year in which loan was made). The second equation uses ﬁnancial depth, pdcredit is the
ratio of total credit to GDP in the country where the loan was made. In Table IV we show
just the coefﬁcient on the market size variable. The ﬁrst column shows the market size
variables added to the base line for all non LBO loans. These results suggest that there
is a positive relationship between the market size and the spread. However, our earlier
discussion indicated that the relationship might be more subtle; that is, the effect of market
size might differ between large and small markets.
Thus, we separate the sample into a large country group (UK, Germany, France and
Italy) and a small country sample (the remaining European countries).7 The baseline equa-
tion for the spread with one of the market size measures is estimated for each country group.
The equations are estimated for all non LBO loans and include the base line variables plus
the dummy that indicates a lead foreign bank arranger.8 The last two columns of Table IV
show the coefﬁcients for the scale variables in each sample. A one percent increase in the
size of the credit market is associated with 15.5 bp increase in spreads in the large countries
and a 10.5 bp decrease in the spread in small companies.
The results provide striking support for H2. In large countries, spreads on syndicated
loans increase with the size or depth of the ﬁnancial market. This ﬁnding suggests that loan
syndication is associated with increased risk taking in larger markets. In smaller countries
there is a negative relationship between ﬁnancial market size and loan spreads though the
7We experimented with alternative break points between the large and small countries and found that the
results reported here are robust.
8A few observations are lost because aggregate credit data is missing for some transition countries in the
mid 1990s.
10relationship is not signiﬁcant for ﬁnancial depth. In small countries, the spreads are neg-
atively related to ﬁnancial market size or depth. The comparison of the characteristics of
big and small country borrowers in the syndicated loan market shown in Table V supports
this interpretation. While ﬁrms borrowing in large markets are larger in size, they tend to
be more leveraged and have fewer tangible assets to pledge as collateral compared to the
borrowers from small markets. Risk taking in large markets goes beyond the effect of these
observable characteristics which are included in the baseline speciﬁcation and held constant
in these regressions.
Our interpretation of H2 is that loan syndication expands the range of ﬁnancial services
availableinsmallandundevelopedﬁnancialmarkets. Animportantwayinwhichthisoccurs
is through the participation of foreign banks in the syndication or as lead arrangers which
will be analyzed next.
4.2. Foreign lead arrangers in syndicated loan markets
Our third hypothesis deals with foreign bank participation in syndicated loan markets in
large and small countries. In our sample, 21 percent of the loans in large countries and
41 percent of the loans in small countries use a foreign lead arranger. Mixed foreign and
domestic leads are more common in large countries and purely domestic lending is more
common is large countries too. Our hypotheses suggest that there is a different motivation
for foreign participation in large and in small countries. In order to test for this we estimate
the base line equation for all non LBO loans and add dummy variables for foreign partici-
pation and country size as well as its interaction. The speciﬁc parameterization including an
interaction term takes the following form:
log(spreadijt) = ait +bjt +gForeign+sBigCountry+dForeign∗BigCountry+eijt (2)
with ait being short for the baseline loan contract characteristics and betajt being short for
borrower characteristics. In addition, Foreign is a dummy for foreign bank participation and
BigCountry is a dummy for the large ﬁnancial markets (UK, Germany, France and Italy).
11The coefﬁcient of interest is d which measures whether foreign banks charge a different
spread in small versus large ﬁnancial markets compared to domestic banks. A summary of
results, the coefﬁcients on the dummy variables and the interaction terms for estimates with
all non-LBO loans are shown in Table VI.
The ﬁrst three equations do not have an interaction term. Spreads are larger for big
country borrowers and when there is a foreign lead arranger. The latter effect is only signif-
icant when we include bank ﬁxed effects.9 In the last three columns we add the interaction
term between foreign bank lead arranger and big countries. The results are striking; the
foreign banks charge higher spreads than domestic banks for similar loans in big countries.
One way to view these results is to think of the domestic bank syndicator in a small coun-
try as the base case. Referring to equation (4), 10 the results indicate that the foreign lead
arranger in the small country charges slightly less, the foreign dummy is negative but small
and insigniﬁcant. Spreads are about one-third larger for domestic syndicators in big coun-
tries (the coefﬁcient of 0.34 on the big country dummy). Foreign banks in big countries
are charging more than 50 percent more than a domestic syndicator in a small country. The
positive interaction coefﬁcients indicate that foreign banks charge a higher spread in large
as compared to small countries. In addition, foreign bank syndicators have about the same
spreads as domestic syndicators in small countries but have substantially higher spreads in
large countries. This ﬁnding is in contrast to the usual understanding of foreign banking
activity and suggests that syndicated loan markets differ from regular loan markets. For
example, Mian (2004) argues that private domestic banks appear to be more ”aggressive” in
their lending than foreign banks. We ﬁnd that foreign banks earn higher spreads - especially
in larger ﬁnancial markets - suggesting that foreign banks are the more aggressive lenders
at least in large markets. Comparing borrower characteristics of foreign and domestic bank
customers in the syndicated loan markets supports our ﬁnding. As shown in Table V, for-
9We can include bank ﬁxed effects and the foreign dummy because many banks are active in both their
home markets (where they are not foreign) as well as elsewhere. Similarly, the big country effect cannot be
estimated with borrower ﬁxed effects because each borrower is country speciﬁc.
10The results with bank ﬁxed effects may be less reliable because the sample size is much smaller because
the name of the bank is often not shown in the data.
12eign banks engage with smaller borrowers compared to domestic banks (measured by total
assets) even in small ﬁnancial systems.
To further illustrate these ﬁnding, we estimate a probit model on a dummy variable
that takes the value of one if a loan contract is written by a foreign versus a domestic lead
arranger (mixed leads are omitted in this analysis). We also test whether the spread on a
loan associated with foreign lead arrangers differs between foreign lead arrangers operating
in small versus large ﬁnancial systems. The probit results are shown in Table VII. On aver-
age foreign lead arrangers charge a higher spread in both small and large ﬁnancial markets
but the effect is much larger in large markets. This is in line with previous literature that
argues that foreign banks need to be compensated for overcoming informational and cultural
barriers (see e.g. Buch 2003). The magnitude and signiﬁcance of the spread coefﬁcient is,
however, higher in large countries. This result is surprising, since informational and cultural
barriers are expected to be higher in small as compared to large ﬁnancial systems. In the
bottom of Table VII the marginal effect of the corresponding coefﬁcients are provided. This
marginal effect gives the change in probability for an inﬁnitesimal change in the log(spread).
This ﬁnding suggests that foreign lead arrangers engage in different kind of lending
arrangements in small versus large systems. To directly illustrate our fourth hypothesis we
compare differences in loan characteristics between foreign and domestic lead arrangers
in small versus large ﬁnancial systems. Our claim is that there is more risk being taken
on by foreign arrangers in larger ﬁnancial markets. The leverage and tangibility ratios of
the borrowers are general indicators of the riskiness of loans with industry and loan term
characteristics held constant. Thus, in Table V we compare means of the leverage and
tangibility ratios of borrowers foreign banks lend to in small versus large markets. These
ﬁguressuggestthatinlargerﬁnancialsystems, foreignbanksarewillingtoengageinlending
with more leveraged borrowers that have a lower level of tangible assets.
135. Conclusion
One ﬁnancial market where cross border activity is substantial is the syndicated loan market.
In our sample of European loan syndications since 1995, fully 71 percent of all loans include
some foreign participation. Loan syndications provide a convenient and relatively accessible
means for banks to cross national borders. A bank can diversify its portfolios by lending
abroad without establishing a banking operation which would involve regulation in the host
country and without raising funds in a foreign market. However, it is also the case that
foreign banks may face higher information costs in a foreign environment.
To better understand the integration of capital markets in Europe, we analyze the
spreads faced by banks on syndicated loans. We ﬁnd that the motivation for foreign entry
differs between small and large countries. Surprisingly, rate spreads increase with market
size in large countries, particularly for foreign banks. This suggests that loan syndications
which spread risks are used for risky lending in large countries. In small countries, where
markets are less developed, spreads decrease with market size. That is, in small countries,
loan syndications serve to complete markets and ﬁll in for the absence of domestic bor-
rowing opportunities. In the smaller countries, as the market grows, lending becomes more
competitive and spreads decline.
Overall, syndicated lending is an important vehicle for foreign bank participation in
both large and small countries. However, capital market integration serves different func-
tions in the large and small markets.
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16Table I
Deﬁnition of variables
Characteristics of borrowing ﬁrm:
log(asset): logarithm of total assets
Tangibility: ratio of ﬁrms ﬁxed assets to total assets
Leverage: ratio of debt to total assets
ROE: return on shareholder funds (equity)
Cash: ratio of cash ﬂow to operating proﬁt
WorkingCap: working capital per employee
Sichightech: Dummy if ﬁrm operates in high tech industry
Siclowtech: Dummy if ﬁrm operates in low tech industry
Sicholding: Dummy if ﬁrm is a ﬁnancial holding company
Tikdum: Dummy if ﬁrm is publicly listed
Characteristics of loan:
log(spread): basis points above LIBOR
Maturity: maturity of loan contract in months
log(loansize): logarithm of the face value of the loan (in $)
Pcorporate: Dummy if loan is for corporate purpose
Plbo: Dummy if loan is for leveraged buyout
Pproject: Dummy if loan is to ﬁnance a project
Coven: Dummy if ﬁnancial covenants are speciﬁed in the contract
Nrlenders: number of lenders participating in loan
Trevolver: Dummy if speciﬁc tranche type is revolver loan
TtermA: Dummy if speciﬁc tranche type is term A loan
TtermB: Dummy if speciﬁc tranche type is term B loan
Ttermrest: Dummy if speciﬁc tranche type is higher than term B loan
17Table II
Sample composition and spreads by country and nationality of arranger
Notes: This table reports the number of loan contracts and mean spreads above Libor for each sample country.
In the last three columns mean spreads arranged by nationality of the lead arrangers are shown. A lead arranger
is classiﬁed as ‘Foreign’ if the lead arranger’s (or all lead arrangers in case of multiple lead arrangers) country
of origin differs from the borrower’s country of origin. A lead arranger is classiﬁed as ‘Domestic’ of the
country of origin of borrower and lead arranger is identical. If a loan contract is arranged by multiple lead
arrangers that are classiﬁed as ‘Domestic’ and ‘Foreign’, the ‘Mixed’ category is coded.
Spread by lead arranger nationality
country Freq. Percent Spread Foreign Domestic Mixed
Austria 21 0.33 254.64 293.06 - 24.17
Belgium 80 1.25 180.18 199.08 86.25 113.33
Croatia 17 0.26 140.00 130.36 - 185.00
Czech Rep. 22 0.34 103.09 102.05 125.00 -
Denmark 45 0.70 205.82 263.15 - 145.89
Finland 93 1.45 119.84 140.09 68.50 90.89
France 1099 17.13 187.53 283.61 169.83 160.52
Germany 1392 21.70 222.65 294.80 214.25 190.33
Greece 83 1.29 125.03 168.84 142.50 85.74
Hungary 9 0.14 42.86 55.60 - 81.25
Iceland 10 0.16 151.50 115.00 175.83 -
Ireland 38 0.59 215.07 221.79 75.00 167.50
Italy 375 5.84 189.22 233.45 174.89 189.31
Luxembourg 23 0.36 170.00 183.81 - 25.00
Netherlands 337 5.25 199.27 245.06 208.28 182.87
Norway 140 2.18 139.98 179.62 111.12 108.10
Poland 85 1.32 99.47 110.81 96.00 79.04
Portugal 30 0.47 72.21 59.88 30.00 86.53
Romania 29 0.45 235.00 234.46 - 250.00
Slovakia 11 0.17 140.82 138.00 - 148.33
Spain 683 10.65 132.83 203.00 100.65 105.33
Sweden 240 3.74 194.61 297.35 76.61 101.59
Switzerland 160 2.49 144.35 167.53 238.75 121.43
United Kingdom 1394 21.73 215.61 231.48 263.13 157.17
Total 6,416 100 191.16 233.25 199.98 156.16
18Table III
Estimates of the base line equation
Notes: The table shows regression results from estimating speciﬁcation log(spreadijt) = ait +bjt +eijt. The
dependent variable is the logarithm of the spread between the Libor rate and the speciﬁc loan contract rate.
Loan contract characteristics are summarized by ait and borrower characteristics by bjt. Variables are deﬁned
as in Table I. Robust t-statistics are reported below each coefﬁcient in parentheses. In column 1, estimates for
the entire sample are presented. In column 2, LBO loans are excluded from the sample. In columns 3, 4 and 5,
loan contracts with ‘Foreign’, ‘Domestic’ and ‘Mixed’ lead arrangers are included in the sample, respectively.
The bottom line of the table states the number of observations and adjusted R-squared of each estimation.
*,**,*** indicates signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent: log(spread) log(spread) log(spread) log(spread) log(spread)
Sample: all excl. LBOs foreign leads domestic only mixed leads
maturity 0.005 -0.000 0.003 -0.001 0.001
(9.68)** (0.07) (2.43)* (2.15)* (0.60)
lgloansize -0.059 -0.119 -0.097 -0.090 -0.178
(4.98)** (5.86)** (2.34)* (3.12)** (5.04)**
lgasset -0.016 -0.021 -0.029 -0.003 -0.023
(4.50)** (4.01)** (2.26)* (0.31) (2.85)**
tangibility -0.183 -0.165 -0.136 -0.101 -0.077
(4.17)** (2.11)* (0.74) (0.92) (0.59)
leverage 0.369 0.482 0.723 0.166 0.730
(7.40)** (5.27)** (3.51)** (2.01)* (3.88)**
sichtech -0.036 -0.083 0.012 -0.095 -0.101
(1.23) (1.60) (0.08) (1.06) (1.46)
siclowtech -0.074 -0.020 0.004 -0.011 -0.011
(2.89)** (0.40) (0.04) (0.14) (0.14)
sicholding -0.096 -0.211 -0.199 -0.402 -0.105
(sic rest left out) (2.95)** (4.52)** (1.94) (4.73)** (1.59)
pcorporate 0.194 -0.109 -0.169 -0.063 -0.042
(2.79)** (1.63) (1.39) (0.76) (0.26)
plbo 1.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(pproject left out) (14.54)** (.) (.) (.) (.)
ROE -0.258 -0.088 0.542 -0.201 -0.872
(2.12)* (0.34) (1.56) (0.27) (1.59)
cash ﬂow -0.132 -0.229 -0.362 -0.184 -0.074
(2.29)* (3.00)** (1.79) (1.32) (0.73)
working cap -0.186 -0.380 0.219 8.400 1.051
(0.15) (0.27) (0.07) (0.71) (0.67)
Covenant 0.261 0.472 0.720 0.322 0.400
(7.14)** (9.33)** (6.66)** (3.23)** (6.25)**
nrlenders -0.014 -0.008 -0.012 -0.006 -0.003
(10.17)** (3.51)** (2.64)** (1.12) (0.86)
tikdum -0.184 -0.150 -0.130 -0.183 -0.115
(5.20)** (3.43)** (1.39) (1.88) (1.96)
trevolver -0.219 -0.105 0.030 -0.101 -0.186
(8.40)** (2.86)** (0.35) (1.63) (3.31)**
ttermA 0.018 0.564 1.051 0.360 0.233
(0.55) (4.38)** (6.49)** (2.48)* (0.76)
ttermB 0.130 0.727 1.211 0.507 0.291
(3.87)** (5.72)** (7.35)** (3.92)** (0.98)
ttermrest 0.252 0.804 0.896 0.629 0.689
(7.18)** (3.64)** (2.04)* (1.38) (2.04)*
Constant 5.291 6.894 6.231 6.410 7.714
(24.91)** (20.00)** (8.53)** (12.87)** (13.35)**
Observations 4119 1840 398 528 914
R-squared 0.56 0.33 0.42 0.20 0.29
19Table IV
Market size/depth and average loan spreads
Notes: The table shows regression results from estimating speciﬁcation log(spreadijt) = ait + bjt + d ·
CreditMarket +eijt. The dependent variable is the logarithm of the spread between the Libor rate and the
speciﬁc loan contract rate. Loan contract characteristics are summarized by ait and borrower characteristics
by bjt. CreditMarket is short for measures of the credit market size and depth of each borrower’s country of
operation. Variables are deﬁned as in Table I. Robust t-statistics are reported below each coefﬁcient in paren-
theses. In column 1, estimates for the entire sample are presented. In column 2, the speciﬁcation is run only
for larger countries (UK, Germany, France and Italy) and in column 3 only for small countries (the remainder
of the sample countries). LBO loans are excluded from the sample. Only the coefﬁcients ofCreditMarket are
reported below. The second line of the table states the number of observations and the bottom line the adjusted
R-squared of each estimation. *,**,*** indicates signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
All countries Large countries Small countries
Observations 1835 974 861
lgcredit 0.036 0.155 -0.104
(2.35)** (2.18)** ( -4.03)***
R-squared 0.332 0.411 0.301
pdcredit 0.001 0.003 -0.0003
(2.07)** (3.47)*** (-0.40)
R-squared 0.332 0.416 0.286
20Table V
Borrower characteristics
Notes: This table reports mean values of borrower characteristics. The sample is split up between big and small countries (‘BigCountry’ and ‘SmallCountry’).
‘BigCountry’ is short for the countries UK, Germany, France, Italy and ‘SmallCountry’ are the remaining sample countries. Further, the sample is split
up between borrower characteristics that have a loan contract with a ‘Domestic’ and ‘Foreign’ lead arranger. Variables are deﬁned as in Table I. The
corresponding number of observations is reported in parentheses below each mean value.
BigCountry SmallCountry
BigCountry SmallCountry Foreign Domestic Foreign Domestic Foreign Domestic
Total Assets 4120 50.2 748 2750 2000 4550 13.8 68.6
(n=1557) (n=1313) (n=700) (n=2170) (n=259) (n=1298) (n=441) (n=872)
Leverage 0.63 0.59 0.62 0.61 0.69 0.61 0.57 0.60
(n=1547) (n=1313) (n=698) (n=2162) (n=257) (n=1290) (n=441) (n=872)
Tangibility 0.61 0.65 0.63 0.63 0.59 0.62 0.66 0.64
(n=1547) (n=1304) (n=694) (n=2157) (n=257) (n=1290) (n=437) (n=867)
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1Table VI
Lending spreads of foreign lead arrangers in small versus large countries
Notes: The table shows regression results from estimating speciﬁcation log(spreadijt) = ait +bjt +gForeign+sBigCountry+dForeign∗BigCountry+eijt.
The dependent variable is the logarithm of the spread between the Libor rate and the speciﬁc loan contract rate. Loan contract characteristics are summarized
by ait and borrower characteristics by bjt. Foreign is a dummy for foreign bank participation and BigCountry is a dummy for the large ﬁnancial markets (UK,
Germany, France and Italy). The coefﬁcient d measures whether foreign banks charge a different spread in small versus large ﬁnancial markets compared to
domestic banks. Variables are deﬁned as in Table I. Robust standard errors are reported below each coefﬁcient in parentheses. The bottom line of the table
states the number of observations and the adjusted R-squared of each estimation. *,**,*** indicates signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Foreign 0.06 0.06 0.28 -0.06 -0.05 0.12
(0.051) (0.073) (0.084)*** (0.067) (0.083) (0.111)
BigCountry 0.38 - 0.38 0.34 - 0.28
(0.053)*** (0.099)*** (0.053)*** (0.110)***
Foreign*BigCountry - - - 0.27 0.30 0.29
(0.092)*** (0.105)*** (0.135)**
Loan Characteristics yes yes yes yes yes yes
Borrower Characteristics yes yes yes yes yes yes
Borrower Fixed Effects no yes no no yes no
Bank Fixed Effects no no yes no no yes
adj. R-squared 35.12% 20.55% 33.43% 35.45% 21.80% 33.96%
N 1835 1789 726 1835 1789 726
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2Table VII
Loan spreads of foreign and domestic lead arrangers
Notes: The table shows results from estimating the probit model Foreign = g·log(spreadijt)+ait +bjt +eijt.
The dependent variable Foreign is a dummy that takes the value of one if the lead arranger’s country of origin
differs from the borrower’s country of origin and zero otherwise. log(spreadijt) is the logarithm of the spread
between the Libor rate and the speciﬁc loan contract rate. Loan contract characteristics are summarized by ait
and borrower characteristics by bjt. Variables are deﬁned as in Table I. Robust standard errors are reported
below each coefﬁcient in parentheses. In column 1, the estimates of the entire sample are shown. In column 2,
only loan contracts from borrowers originated from small countries and in column 3, only from large countries
are included in the sample. Large countries are UK, Germany, France, Italy and small countries are the
remaining sample countries. The bottom line of the table states the number of observations and the pseudo
R-squared of each estimation. *,**,*** indicates signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
(1) (2) (3)
Sample All Small countries Large countries
Dependent Foreign Foreign Foreign
log(Spread) 0.11 0.12 0.28
(0.045)** (0.063)* (0.078)***
Loan Characteristics yes yes yes
Borrower Characteristics yes yes yes
marginal effect of 0.03 0.04 0.05
log(Spread) (0.013)** (0.022)* (0.013)***
Pseudo R-squared 4.86% 4.68% 17.18%
N 1894 890 1004
23